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I. THE DILEMMA OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW TREATISES
Writing a treatise on constitutional law is both necessary and
impossible. It is necessary because constitutional law, at least in the
United States, is a common law subject.' To be sure, it possesses a
positive law basis, but that basis is very thin and the decisional law
that has flowed from it is luxuriant and complex. In a real positive law
subject, like labor law, securities law, or environmental law, one should
know the judicial decisions, but one must also read the statute, and one
might very well choose to resolve a question of interpretation solely on
the basis of that reading. But who, other than a small minority of
rabid textualists, would resolve a question about free speech rights by
reading the First Amendment? Typically, one does not even refer back
to the text-it is too familiar and too elliptical to do much more than
define the topic. Rather, one studies the vast body of free speech cases
for precedents, analogies, or general principles.
The common law character of constitutional law makes a treatise
on the subject a necessity. Treatises organize and summarize bodies
of decisional law, creating a coherent structure from the welter of incre-
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mental decisions, overlapping doctrines, and particularized holdings
and dicta. The general contours of common law subjects-the
categories in which we think about the entire area-are largely the
creations of the great treatise writers, from Blackstone,2 through
Holmes,3  Williston,4  Corbin,' and Wigmore,6  to Prosser,7
Gilmore,8 and Scott.' To be sure, the Constitution, as positive law,
provides a few categories for us, but the mass of decisional law is so
great that within each of these broadly-defined categories lies the same
trackless morass that we would encounter in an unexplicated body of
common law decisions.
Yet it is impossible to write a treatise about constitutional law.
All treatises depend, for their effectiveness, upon a trick or, to put the
matter only a bit more politely, a conceit. This conceit is that the
mass of cases, decided by different courts at different periods of time
reflect universal, timeless principles that underlie and animate the
subject matter. One hundred years ago this conceit was a theory;
indeed, it was a theory that identified itself as science, although it
subsequently became known as formalism.' ° It had its passionate
adherents, so passionate that they created a new professional school at
Harvard and fanned out across the nation, conquering other law
schools and purging them of those who dared adopt a different
approach.1 Many great American treatises were written during this
era, and they derive their greatness from the sense of authority that
this triumphant theory conferred upon them.' 2
No one believes in formalism anymore; we recognize that law is
the creation of particular decisionmakers, whether legislative or judicial,
that law changes over time, and that those changes tend to reflect the
2. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (U. Chi. Ed.
1979).
3. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
4. SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920-22).
5. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1950).
6. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1923).
7. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1941).
8. GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965).
9. AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1939).
10. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); Dennis
Patterson, Langdell's Legacy, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 196 (1995).
11. WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE GOVERNMENT (1982); Alfred S. Konefsky & John Henry Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror on the
Wall: Histories of American Law Schools, 95 HARV. L. REV. 833 (1982).
12. E.g., CORBIN, supra note 5; WILLISTON, supra note 4; WIGMORE, supra note 6. See
A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal
Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632 (1981).
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prevailing attitudes of the era that produces them. Virtually all
political scientists 3 and many legal scholars associated with the legal
realist or critical legal studies movement 4 believe that there is nothing
other than these changing attitudes. Most legal scholars, however,
agree that doctrine possesses some reality, that it constitutes a
specialized body of knowledge that interacts with changing attitudes.'"
As a result, it changes slowly and assimilates public attitudes through
a thick, transforming lens. This phenomenon allows the conceit of
formalism to be sustained in the post-formalist era. Although scholars
generally recognize that doctrine changes in response to social attitudes,
doctrine can be presented as a unified, coherent group of decisions with
an internal logic because the changes are gradual and because the
secular attitudes are muted and transformed by legal decisionmakers. 16
But this conceit breaks down when constitutional law is con-
cerned. In that field, the changes are so rapid, so loosely fitted into a
general scheme, and so obviously political that they simply rip apart
any doctrinal framework that is constructed to contain them. The
development of promissory estoppel or the abandonment of sovereign
immunity are important legal changes. But, only a legal academic can
discern that they are linked to changing social attitudes, rather than a
process of revealing and implementing true principles inherent in the
common law. In contrast, any ordinary citizen can identify the
13. See, e.g., LAURENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY (3d ed.
1994); HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS AND JUSTICE (3d ed. 1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL
& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL (1993);
GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF COURTS
(Rev. ed. 1974); HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING: EXPLANATION AND
PREDICTION (1979). But see, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND CONSTRAINTS (2d ed. 1995).
14. See, e.g., MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1780-1860 (1977); MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1960 (1992) [hereinafter HOROWITZ II]; ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards, Nihilism
and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Doum: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
15. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH (1992); Owen M. Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND
OBJECTIVITY (1992); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); FREDERICK SHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991); Victoria Nourse, Making Constitutional Doctrine in a Realist Age,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1401 (1997).
16. This concept of law's relative autonomy follows autopoietic theory. See GUNTHER
TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (1993); Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the "Relative
Autonomy" of Law. 19 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 1998) (discussing NIKLAS LUHMANN,
DAS RECHT DER GESSELLSCHAFT (1993)). See also Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology
of Law, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 521.
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political forces that motivated Brown v. Board of Educ., " Roe v.
Wade,"8 or Bowers v. Hardwick.19 In short, it is easy enough to
write a political history of constitutional decisions, but it is impossible
to write a legal treatise that presents constitutional law as a coherent
body of doctrine.
Treatise writers on constitutional law, responding to the necessity
of the task, and braving its impossibility, have adopted a variety of
strategies. The formalists inherited from their predecessors a tradition
that the Constitution was an evolving document.2" Their tendency,
in response, was to avoid constitutional law as excessively political; like
statutory law, constitutional law was viewed as an outlier, unavoidable
in its importance, but less than useful pedagogically because studying
its decisions provided no access to the magisterial principles of general
law.21 Thus, the great treatises of the period deal with common law
subjects. One effort to address constitutional law during this period
is Westel Willoughby's, The Constitutional Law of the United States.
2
Willoughby, ironically, was a political scientist, but his treatise adopts
the prevailing style of the times. His Preface states:
In the preparation of this work, the aim has been to give a logical
and complete exposition of the general principles of the constitution-
al law of the United States ... to present, as a systematic whole, a
statement of the underlying doctrines by which our complex system
of constitutional jurisprudence is governed. 23
Thus, Willoughby treats Dred Scott v. Sanford24 as one of the
decisions from which these principles are to be discerned, except to the
extent that it was overruled by constitutional amendment. 2' He
dutifully presents the conclusions of the recently-established substan-
tive due process doctrine as enduring legal doctrine. 26 Prior decisions
may be overruled, he concedes, as they are in common law, but the
17. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
20. See PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 65-96 (1992).
21. See CHASE, supra note 11.
22. WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1910).
23. Id. at iii.
24. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
25. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 22, at 262-69.
26. Id. at 872-73. See also id. at 734-73 (similar treatment of recently decided cases
restricting scope of federal control over interstate commerce).
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purpose of such overruling is for the court to correct an error by
"repudiating or modifying its former decision. '"27
No contemporary work is likely to adopt an approach such as this;
more characteristic is John Nowak and Ronald Rotunda's treatise,28
which treats constitutional law as a series of politically-motivated
decisions. The authors provide comprehensive summaries of major
cases, but offer no overarching principles by which these cases can be
reconciled. Indeed, they treat these differences with an aplomb that
suggests that no reconciliation is to be expected. Laurence Tribe at-
tempts an intermediate approach.29 He regards constitutional law, at
any given period, as a coherent body of doctrine, but takes account of
the obvious changes by treating the history of constitutional law as a
succession of six or seven models of such doctrine, each of which is
based on different premises." There is an obviously procrustean
quality to his effort, but that may be its basic purpose-to inquire
whether the ongoing and apparently inconsistent flux of constitutional
decisions can be fit into coherent conceptual patterns, even if those
patterns vary across time.
II. CHEMERINSKY'S APPROACH
Erwin Chemerinsky's Constitutional Law: Principles and
Policies31 continues the necessary task of writing treatises on constitu-
tional law. But it also comes surprisingly close to achieving the
impossible. Like Tribe, Chemerinsky adopts an intermediate position
between formalism and legal realism; he treats constitutional law as
something that changes in response to changing political conditions,
but that nonetheless possesses a certain degree of conceptual coherence.
Unlike Tribe, however, Chemerinsky does not achieve this synthesis
by viewing the process of change as a transition between fixed or
quantized states. Rather, Chemerinsky's view is that constitutional law
is a loosely structured body of doctrine that flows from one shape to
another, changing continuously but nonetheless preserving a certain
degree of conceptual unity at any given time. This is ultimately a
more realistic approach, demanding less of an interpretive overlay on
the actual language of the judicial decisions and capturing the political
aspect of the Supreme Court's decisions.
27. Id. at 52.
28. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1995).
29. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988).
30. See id. §§ I-1 to 1-9, at 1-17.
31. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (1997).
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But Chemerinsky does more than present a realistic political
account; he almost succeeds in establishing the doctrinal integrity that
is implicit in the enterprise of writing a legal treatise, as opposed to a
political history, of constitutional law. He does so by adopting two
related perspectives. The first is that constitutional law is a matter of
interpretation and that interpretive methodologies differ. He presents
these differences as a conflict between originalism and nonoriginal-
ism;12 this is, of course, a simplification, but it provides a workable
framework for identifying differences in the judicial approach to
constitutional questions. In beginning with interpretive theory,
Chemerinsky departs from the approach taken by other contemporary
treatise writers: Tribe begins with the purpose of the Constitution,33
while Nowak and Rotunda begin with the nature of judicial review.
34
Interestingly, Willoughby began his treatise with a discussion of
interpretive principles, but he treats these as a set of definitive rules,
rather than as contested terrain.35
Chemerinsky's second strategy is less explicit, but emerges from
the structure of his text. Consistent with their general approach,
Nowak and Rotunda tend to present constitutional doctrine as a
succession of decisions, while Tribe tends to present it as a series of
generalized models. Chemerinsky, in contrast, organizes his discussion
around rather specific issues and topics. This has the practical virtue
of making his treatise the easiest to use. By looking at his topic
headings and then reading the relatively short discussions, one can
rather quickly and precisely determine the current status of the
doctrine in a given area. But this organization also has the effect of
segregating the areas of change from the areas of stability. Instead of
treating constitutional doctrine as something that lurches from one
decision to another or that undergoes relatively rapid paradigm shifts,
Chemerinsky treats it as a body of doctrine that is stable in some areas,
recently resolved in others, and still changing or uncertain in others.
This mode of presentation, when combined with his explicit focus
on interpretive issues, brings Chemerinsky's treatise about as close to
being a "real" treatise as a treatise on constitutional law can be. The
doctrine cannot be presented as a conceptually coherent unit, but it is
at least presented as possessing some core area of coherence, even if the
location of that core migrates over time. Its changes result not only
32. Id. § 1.4, at 15-25.
33. TRIBE, supra note 29, §§ 1-1 to 1-9, 2-1 to 2-4, at 1-22.
34. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 28, §§ 1.1-1.6, at 1-20.
35. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 22, at 15-52.
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from the obvious political forces, but from the use of different
strategies for interpretation. Unlike politics, these strategies are
inherently legal, and they never become outmoded. The politics of the
Dred Scott decision are absolutely monstrous by contemporary
standards; even racist fringe groups would find them insupportable.
Its defense of originalism, however, reads perfectly well today, and
could be quoted by the current Court but for its odious origin.36 By
treating the changes in doctrine as partially interpretive and by
focusing on specific issues, Chemerinsky is able to provide an
unusually coherent overview of constitutional doctrine. Here is where
the doctrine has been stable, he tells us; here is where it has changed.
Those changes, though partially the result of politics, are also the result
of the continuing interplay of a set of interpretive strategies that has
remained relatively constant over time.
As a result, constitutional doctrine as presented by Chemerinsky
has a law-like form. In some areas, we can state broad, stable
principles of constitutional law, as we can for tort or contract law. In
other areas, the law is contested, but it is contested for reasons inherent
to the doctrine, just as promissory estoppel or sovereign immunity was
contested by those who differed about their implicit doctrinal logic. In
still other areas, of course, constitutional doctrine changes for political
reasons. Even here, however, Chemerinsky is able to provide some
sense of coherence. Instead of a succession of cases, or a set of
paradigm shifts, he depicts a process where the doctrine coheres around
a new substantive position, gathering itself together like an injured
amoeba.
A good example is the treatment of the right of privacy cases, a
topic that will put any claim of coherence for constitutional law to a
severe test. Chemerinsky begins by defining the concept of a
fundamental right, which he depicts as a sort of equal protection-due
process amphibian.37 He then presents the Court's framework of
analysis: Is there a fundamental right; is the right infringed; is there
sufficient justification for the infringement; and, is the means suffi-
36. Justice Taney wrote:
If any of [the Constitution's] provisions are deemed unjust, there is a prescribed mode
in the instrument itself by which it might be amended; but while it remains unaltered,
it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption .... Any
other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make
it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 426.
37. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, § 10.1.1, at 638-39.
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ciently related to the purpose?38 This is rather thin and methodologi-
cal as an overarching legal doctrine, but it does work. Both Roe v.
Wade39 and Bowers v. Hardwick4° fit into this framework.
Chemerinsky then continues by considering specific fundamental
rights. First are the rights of family autonomy: the right to marry; the
right to have custody of one's children; the right to keep the family
together; and the right to control the upbringing of one's children.4
Next are rights of reproductive autonomy: the right to procreate; the
right to purchase contraceptives; and the right to abortion, with its
manifold variations.42 He follows this with rights of sexual activity
and orientation and the right to control medical care.43 Overall, the
issues move from family-oriented claims to individually-oriented claims
and simultaneously move from Supreme Court recognition to Supreme
Court rejection. Chemerinsky thus provides a substantive coherence,
or unity, to the doctrine that parallels the methodological unity with
which he begins the chapter. The Court, he implies, favors constitu-
tional protection of sexual activity when that activity can be linked to
traditional family life-families being essentially sexual units, but units
with an important role in the traditional structure of society. This
approach has the virtue of comprehensibility, and it almost makes the
doctrine sufficiently coherent to qualify for treatment in a legal treatise.
There are, of course, a variety of uncertainties and debates within
each area. Chemerinsky fully acknowledges, for example, that the right
of parental custody that was strongly established in Santosky v.
Kramer44 and Stanley v. Illinois45 seems to conflict with the subse-
quent decisions in Lehr v. Robertson46 and Michael H. v. Gerald D.47
But every common law area is subject to such disputes, and their
existence does not derogate from the overall coherence of the doctrine.
The real problem is that family rights have only a tenuous relationship
to the Supreme Court's articulated rationale of privacy, and there is no
38. Id. § 10.1.2, at 640-44.
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
41. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, § 10.2, at 644-57.
42. Id. § 10.3, at 657-85. These variations include waiting periods, informed consent,
reporting requirements, and restrictions on government funding.
43. Id. §§ 10.4, 10.5, at 685-95. In the remainder of the chapter, Chemerinsky covers other
fundamental rights such as the right to travel, the right to vote, and the right of access to the
courts. Id. §§ 10.6-10.10, at 695-746.
44. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
45. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
46. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
47. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Chemerinsky's discussion of these cases appears at CHEMERIN-
SKY, supra note 31, § 10.2.2, at 648-51.
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independent constitutional rationale that the Court has succeeded in
articulating. The political explanation-that a conservative court
prefers "family values" over gay rights because such a preference
corresponds to the Republican political agenda-is irresistible. But
Chemerinsky presents this body of cases in such a clear, orderly
manner that he almost achieves the illusion that is much more readily
achieved in tort or contract. That is, he makes an historically evolving
set of decisions seem like a coherent, unified body of law.
Of course, Chemerinsky's approach can be criticized on both
conceptual and political grounds. The legal realists voiced the former
by criticism asserting that common law was not conceptually coherent
at all; 48 critical legal studies scholars then argued that the claimed
coherence was not only false, but an instrument for legitimating unfair
political arrangements under a false banner of neutrality.49 Chemerin-
sky has voiced a similar criticism of the Rehnquist Court's jurispru-
dence. "[T]he Court and many commentators," he writes, "continue
to talk as if it were possible for judges to decide cases wholly apart
from their personal views. . . . But more than a decade of debate
about constitutional theory has revealed that approaches that promise
to eliminate (or greatly reduce) judicial value choices are unworkable
in practice. ' 0
However, the effort to present constitutional law as possessing
some coherence is unlikely to create this danger in the 1990s.
Whatever the Court says, few people believe that its constitutional
decisions are apolitical. Moreover, Chemerinsky's treatise precludes
any such belief, even among the preternaturally naive, by openly
acknowledging the operation of political forces at relevant points. The
difficulty for constitutional law, rather, lies in the reverse direction;
there is a general doubt that the Justices are ever motivated by
anything aside from political considerations when deciding cases. This
perspective, however, can only lead to a political history of the Court;
it cannot generate a legal treatise about constitutional doctrine. And
because this perspective is largely correct, it is impossible to write a
constitutional law treatise. If one wants to try, however, it is necessary
to present constitutional law as possessing some elements of coherence,
48. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
49. See, e.g., HOROWITZ II, supra note 14; Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979); SINGER, supra note 14; Tushnet, supra note 14.
50. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: Foreword, the Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 90-91 (1989).
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some self-sustaining features that make principles and precedents
relevant to judicial decisions. Chemerinsky's treatise discerns these
elements of coherence and presents them in a clear, readily comprehen-
sible form. That is why he comes so close to succeeding at the
impossible task of writing a constitutional law treatise.
III. RELAXING THE STANDARD FOR DOCTRINAL COHERENCE
As previously stated, Chemerinsky achieves his near-success by
adopting two strategies; first, he openly acknowledges that constitution-
al doctrine is the product of contested interpretive approaches; and
second, he organizes the discussion around specific topics, enabling
him to identify areas of stability as well as areas of change. There is
also a third strategy that Chemerinsky at least implies. This is the idea
that the issues that the courts are deciding, and not just the results
they reach, are the product of large social forces, rather than their own
exercise of power.
Other constitutional law treatises adopt the view that the courts,
specifically the Supreme Court, are the prime movers of constitutional
law, that they generate the general direction and specific content of the
doctrine by the cases they select and the decisions that they reach.
The treatises do not state this explicitly, but they imply it by
structuring their account around lines of cases and judicially articulated
theories. Thus, Tribe begins his discussion of the religion clauses by
identifying different theories that the Court has used,51 while Nowak
and Rotunda discuss the tension between the two clauses, and then
proceed to describe the establishment cases. 2 Even Gerald Rosen-
berg, who argues that the Court has virtually no power to effect social
change, treats the Court as the initiator of its famous, albeit ineffectual
decisions."3
This approach certainly has a good deal to recommend it. Not
only does the Supreme Court decide what kind of opinion it will write,
but it generally decides, through its certiorari process, which cases it
will hear. There is, of course, a mandatory jurisdiction, but its most
characteristic products are those numbing lists of longitude and latitude
that no one but state surveyors and tax collectors ever read. The
discretionary jurisdiction is where the real action lies. The Court can
use its discretionary jurisdiction as an agenda-setting device, as H.W.
51. TRIBE, supra note 29, §§ 14-1 to 14-4, at 1154-69.
52. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 28, §§ 17.1-17.2, at 1218-23.




Perry points out;54 it can set its agenda for the strategic purpose of
preserving its legitimacy, as Alexander Bickel suggests;" and it can
use its latitude in opinion writing for the principled purpose of
generating further information and fostering public debate, as Cass
Sunstein proposes.5 6 The price of this entirely plausible approach,
however, is to preclude the possibility of portraying constitutional law
as a coherent body of doctrine; it makes the Court itself responsible for
the doctrinal oscillations in constitutional law, thereby highlighting the
impact of the judges' political predilections. In effect, it internalizes
politics within the judiciary itself.
Chemerinsky sometimes adopts a different approach. His
discussion of the religion clauses begins with the simple question:
"What is religion?"5" and he presents this question as one that was
forced on the Supreme Court by the selective service cases of the
Vietnam era.5 8 This seems like a possible source of doctrinal integrity
that might be worth pursuing. In essence, it suggests that the Supreme
Court is responding to external forces, and that its doctrinal oscillations
are partially the result of this need to respond, rather than its own
internally generated doctrinal gyrations.
Consider, once again, the right to privacy decisions. Griswold v.
Connecticut59 was decided in 1965, Roe v. Wade6" in 1973, and
Bowers v. Hardwick"' in 1986. As is well known, the Court devel-
oped its concept of constitutional privacy in Griswold to strike down a
conviction under Connecticut's anticontraception statute without
relying on substantive due process.62 It then resorted to this concept
when confronted with other claims about family autonomy, sexual
activity, and related matters, thus developing a body of doctrine that
laid claim to the conceptual coherence associated with legal doctrine.
54. H.W. PERRY JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT (1991).
55. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
56. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term: Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).
57. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, § 12.1.2, at 972.
58. Id. § 12.1.2, at 973-75. The cases are United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), and
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
59. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
62. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, § 10.3.2, at 658-60.
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The general view is that this doctrine was a conceptual disaster and
possessed no coherence at all.63
But one possible reason why the Court has experienced such
difficulties in this area is that it was not in control of its agenda. The
logical case for it to consider after Griswold was Bowers, not Roe.
Griswold, in effect, involved consensual behavior by heterosexual
adults; the Court held Connecticut's statute unconstitutional because
it would interfere with the rights of married couples to use contracep-
tives during their consensual sexual relations. While the Court's
opinion derives some of its rhetorical energy from the fact that the
particular conviction that was being overturned involved the distribu-
tion of contraceptives to married couples, its logic is that the newly-
created constitutional right applies to any adult. That conclusion
followed rather unproblematically in the 1972 case of Eisenstadt v.
Baird.64 The next questions that naturally arise are whether the right
extends to minors and whether the right extends to other types of
sexual activities between consenting adults. The first question was
answered affirmatively in 1977,65 but the second was not addressed
until the Bowers case, in 1986.66 In the interval, the Court was
confronted with the abortion issue in 1973,67 one year after its
decision in Eisenstadt.
Let us assume, for the moment, that the Court was motivated
only by the desire to make coherent law, and not by political consider-
ations; thus, the different composition of the Court between 1973 and
1986 can be ignored. Under this assumption, it was unfortunate for
the Court that it decided the antiabortion law case before the antisod-
omy law case. In deciding Roe, the Court naturally built upon
Griswold, but it expanded the concept beyond the limits of coherence.
Abortion, after all, can only be described as privacy if one concludes
that the fetus is not a person, so that the pregnant woman is the only
person involved. That, however, is precisely the question at issue.
Having extended privacy so far that it includes this obviously marginal
case, the Court's reasoning became still more incoherent when it
63. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159; Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410
(1974); Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981
(1979); John T. Noonan Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV. 668 (1984);
Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569 (1979).
64. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
65. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
66. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
67. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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concluded that a prohibition of oral or anal sex between two consenting
adults, with no other person besides these two individuals involved,
was not included in its capacious concept of privacy. It did so by
recharacterizing its privacy decisions as involving "the right to decide
whether or not to beget or bear a child,"6 which is not what the cases
said, and had never been justified as such by the Court.
Had the Court taken the cases in the reverse order, and assuming
that the results would have been the same, the Court would have used
Bowers to limit its concept of privacy, and then found some other,
more convincing basis for Roe, such as personal autonomy, or the
nonestablishment of religion. Of course, the Court's doctrine would
have also been more coherent had the proximity of Bowers to Griswold
convinced it to decide Bowers differently; and, many commentators feel
that the doctrine would also have been more coherent if the Court had
decided Roe differently, in this case because of the intervening decision
in Bowers.
This increased coherence, however, requires the Court to control
its own agenda. It may be able to do so in the short run, or at the
micro level, through its discretionary jurisdiction; but, it cannot do so
with respect to major social issues. Forces more powerful than the
Court, and, indeed, more powerful than a democratic government in
general, control the timing of these issues. As Rosenberg points out,
criticism of antiabortion laws had risen to a crescendo by the early
1970s.69 This criticism had led to the repeal of antiabortion laws in
three states, one of which was New York.7" While Rosenberg goes
too far in claiming that the Roe decision had minimal effect on the
repeal process,7" he is clearly right to suggest that the issue had been
placed on the Court's agenda, in a manner that precluded its avoid-
ance, by societal forces that were beyond the Court's control. Gay
rights, on the other hand, was still a marginal issue in the early 1970s.
(The statute in Bowers addresses the activity, not the sexual orientation
of the parties, but the prosecution was against a gay person, and the
68. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
69. ROSENBERG, supra note 53, at 258-62.
70. Id. at 263.
71. Although Rosenberg takes the position that the Court does not influence social policy,
he does not advance the idea that external events control the Court's agenda. His discussion of
the abortion rights movement does not appear in his chapter on Roe v. Wade, but instead in a
separate chapter where he argues that the Court does not serve as a "catalyst." Id. at 258-65.
The reason for this odd positioning is probably because treating the Court as an institution that
responds to political forces would integrate the Court into the overall policy process, whereas
Rosenberg wants to isolate it and argue for its lack of influence and impact.
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
Court treated it as a homosexual rights case.)72 The Stonewall
demonstration had occurred some four years earlier, but the issue was
far from the center of public consciousness.73 By the 1980s, the gay
rights movement had grown into a major social force, and the legality
of antigay laws was clearly being forced onto the Court's agenda.
The Court's lack of agenda control, in the privacy cases and so
many other areas, clearly limits its ability to construct coherent
doctrine. Dworkin compares the development of common law doctrine
to the creation of a "chain novel," when each of a group of writers
writes a single chapter and then sends the work on to the next writer
for continuation.74 A novel can indeed be written under these
circumstances, and if Dworkin is right, it will be a coherent one. It
will be a lot less coherent, however, than a novel planned out in
advance, even if that novel is still written by a group of writers. A
more systematic way of expressing the same thought is to treat the
development of doctrine as being subject to path dependency.
Decisions, once taken, cannot be undone, except at enormous cost;
these decisions, however, strongly affect the future decisions, and thus
constrain the decisionmaker in ways that might not have been regarded
as desirable if the entire course of development could have been
surveyed at the outset.
The path-dependent character of doctrine, resulting from the
judiciary's lack of control over its own agenda, suggests that our
standards for doctrinal coherence may be too demanding. The
question is not whether a better doctrine could be constructed ab initio,
but whether each court has done the best job in the circumstances that
have been presented to it. Recognizing the judiciary's dilemma may
allow us to regard its doctrines as more law-like, or coherent, than we
might otherwise imagine. This is particularly true in constitutional
law, where the issues that the Court addresses possess such enormous
public visibility, and where the Court's ability to control its agenda is
correspondingly weaker.
Chemerinsky does not focus on this dilemma, but his treatise
captures its spirit to a greater extent than other works in the field.
Because Chemerinsky's treatise is organized around issues, rather than
around cases or models, it naturally raises the question about where
those issues arose. Because his treatise clearly acknowledges political
72. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing
Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 817 (1997).
74. DwoRKIN, supra note 15, at 228-38.
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forces, it suggests the answer that these issues were not generated by
the Court. It thus implies that the coherence of constitutional doctrine
is the kind of fluid, loosely-structured coherence that Chemerinsky
presents.
CONCLUSION
Professor Chemerinksy's treatise is the best constitutional law
treatise that has been produced to date. It is the best treatise for
practicing lawyers because it adopts a topical approach to the subject
matter, which is the usual research pattern that a practicing lawyer will
follow. Each area of constitutional law, such as federalism, free speech,
or procedural due process is clearly delineated, and the doctrine
pertaining to that area is then presented in a well-organized and
comprehensive fashion. It is also the best treatise from a theoretical
perspective, because it comes closest to presenting constitutional law
as a coherent body of doctrine with an internal logic. As it happens,
these are really the same virtue. The apparent coherence of the
doctrine is precisely what makes it accessible and comprehensible. To
be sure, we are not accustomed to thinking of the needs of practitioners
and the demands of scholars as congruent, particularly in constitutional
law. The usual view is that the theoretical analyses in which scholars
currently engage have risen above, or drifted away from the concerns
of practicing attorneys. But this is a treatise, and the inherent
theoretical premise of a treatise is not hermeneutics or semiotics or
autopoietics; it is the Langdellian formalism that judges claim to
believe, and lawyers are therefore required to espouse. Thus, the
treatise takes us back to those distant, quasi-heroic days when the legal
community possessed a unified discourse. To accomplish this in a
field like constitutional law is impossible, but Chemerinsky has come
close to doing so, and that is a real achievement.
1998]
